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FLORIDA TAX REVIEW 
VOLUME 2 1996 NUMBER 12 
Text, Purpose, Capacity and Albertson's: 
A Response to Professor Geier 
Edward A. 'Zelinsky• 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a recent issue of the Florida Tax Review,1 Professor Deborah 
Geier added yet another chapter to the running commentary on the Albert-
son's litigation, 2 using that case to demonstrate her theories of statutory 
purpose and to criticize, in particular, statutory textualism as she conceives 
of it. Professor Geier correctly identifies the underlying issues in 
Albertson's-the role of statutory purpose, the differing institutional 
capacities of the Congress and the courts, fidelity to statutory text-but 
resolves those issues in ways that prompt me to rebuttal. 
While I commend Professor Geier for her effort to explicate many 
important questions about the Code and its interpretation, I find myself in 
strong disagreement with her conclusions. Professor Geier' s basic analysis is 
unsound and, when applied to Albertson's, produces an incorrect result. Her 
arguments for assigning to the courts a proactive role in tax controversies like 
Albertson's are unconvincing, and her mechanical conception of textualism 
is ultimately unhelpful in exploring the issues in Albertson's. 
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University. 
I thank several colleagues who reviewed an earlier draft of this article: Professors 
Michael Herz, James B. Lewis, Laura Cunningham, Lawrence Cunningham, Noel Cunning-
ham, and Stewart Sterk. Thanks are also due to my advisors on Talmudic issues: Rabbi Daniel 
Greer, Dov hen-Daniel Greer, and Aaron 2.elinsky. 
This article is dedicated to the memory of a loving and heroic woman, my mother-in-
law, Sara Geizhals Twersky, who lost her prolonged battle with cancer while this article was 
being written. 
I . Deborah A. Geier, Interpreting Tax Legislation: The Role of Purpose, 2 Aa. Tax 
Rev. 492 (1995). 
2. The Ninth Circuit issued two opinions in Albertson 's, Inc. v. Commissioner. The 
first opinion, allowing an employer to deduct interest accruing on its obligation under a non-
qualified deferred compensation agreement, was withdrawn by the court and by West Publish-
ing Company, but it is available at 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 33985. The second opinion, finding 
that § 404(a)(5) (delaying an employer's deduction for nonqualified deferred compensation 
until payment) applies to all amounts under a nonqualified deferred compensation agreement, 
including interest, is reported at 42 F.3d 537 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 51 (1995). 
717 
718 Florida Tax Review [Vol. 2:12 
For the Commissioner and the taxpayer, the Supreme Court's refusal 
to hear Albertson's ends the litigation.3 However, for scholars and others 
concerned with the questions raised by the controversy, Albertson's has 
entered the pantheon of cases which, because of the fundamental nature of the 
issues they pose, permanently challenge our understanding of the tax law. 
II. PROFESSOR GEIER'S BASIC ANALYSIS 
Central to Professor Geier' s analysis is the distinction between the 
"fundamental structure" of the Code and those aspects of the Code that 
constitute "[p]ure social policy legislation."4 When courts construe structural 
provisions of the tax statute, Professor Geier asserts, nonliteral, purpose-based 
interpretations are appropriate since the judiciary should protect and be 
guided by "the structure underlying the Internal Revenue Code and created 
by the sum of its sections. "5 On the other hand, the courts should adhere 
more faithfully to statutory text when the text implicates "economic or social 
policy" since "policy choices in a statute are the province of Congress. "6 
There are at least three premises here: The courts can, with a 
reasonable degree of coherence, distinguish structural from nonstructural 
provisions of the Code; structural provisions do not involve congressional 
policy choices to which courts should properly defer; and courts can reliably 
glean from tax provisions an underlying purpose that justifies disregard of 
statutory text. All of these premises are questionable. 
Professor Geier' s distinction between structural and policy provisions 
essentially relabels Professor Stanley Surrey's well-known dichotomy between 
the Code's normative aspects and its tax expenditure provisions.7 Such 
relabelling does not eliminate the problem with the distinction: In its stronger 
form, the distinction is unworkable; in its weaker form, it provides little 
guidance. The problem is not simply one of borderline issues or close cases. 
Rather, at the core of the distinction, no one has convincingly explained how 
to distinguish structural/normative provisions from policy/expenditure 
provisions. 
Consider, for example, the charitable deduction. Professor Geier 
suggests that "one can argue" that section 170 "is premised on nontax 
3. The petition for certiorari asked the Court to review, not only the deferred 
compensation issue which has provoked such controversy, but also the investment tax credits 
taken by Albertson's and challenged by the IRS. 
4. Geier, supra note I, at 497. 
5. Id. at 502. 
6. Id. 
7. See Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures 184-96 (1985). 
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grounds and is therefore outside the fundamental structure of an income 
tax."8 Simultaneously, Professor Geier alludes to Professor William 
Andrews' classic defense of the charitable deduction as part of the normative 
structure of the income tax.9 How, then, is a judge, persuaded that courts 
construing structural provisions should more freely effectuate underlying 
purpose, to decide whether section 170 controversies fall within that rule or 
are to be resolved with greater fidelity to statutory text? Professor Andrews 
extends his logic to deductions and exclusions for medical costs and casualty 
losses, which, he argues, can be understood as normative sections of the 
Code. 10 Is the Geier-guided judge to agree (and thus decide medical expense 
and casualty loss cases by virtue of underlying structural purpose) or to 
embrace the contrary consensus in the tax policy community that sections 
105, 106, 213, and 165(c)(3) are tax expenditures 11 (and thus decide cases 
under these sections with greater respect for the terminology of the statute)? 
If one accepts the basic premises of Professor Andrews' analysis, the 
deduction for state and local taxes is a structuraVnormative provision insofar 
as these taxes finance public outlays similar to charitable, medical, and 
casualty loss disbursements; 12 in contrast, among tax policy commentators, 
section 164 is more commonly viewed as a tax expenditure. 13 
Professor Douglas Kahn argues that accelerated depreciation is 
structurally correct, notwithstanding that much scholarly opinion holds 
otherwise. 14 On the other hand, any depreciation deduction (including 
straight line) deviates from the premises of realization-based taxation since 
8. Geier, supra note l, at 499 n.21. 
9. Id. 
IO. William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 Harv. L. 
Rev. 309 (1972). 
11. See, e.g., Congressional Research Serv., U.S. Senate Budget Comm., Tax 
Expenditures: Compendium of Background Material on Individual Provisions (Senate Print 
103-101), 95 Tax Notes Today 8-35 (Jan. 12, 1995) [hereinafter Tax Expenditures] (analyzing 
as tax expenditures the exclusion from gross income of employer-provided medical benefits, 
the exclusion of payments under medical insurance policies, the deduction for medical 
expenses, and the deduction for personal casualty losses); Joint Comm. on Tax'n, Estimates 
of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 1995-1999 (JCS-6-94 ), 94 Tax Notes Today 221-
23 (Nov. IO, 1994) [hereinafter Estimates] (estimating the tax expenditure costs of these 
exclusions and deductions). 
12. See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Deductibility of State and Local Taxes: Income 
Measurement, Tax Expenditures and Partial, Functional Deductibility, 6 Am. J. Tax Pol'y 9 
(1987). 
13. See Tax Expenditures, supra note 11 (analyzing the deduction for state and local 
taxes as a tax expenditure); Estimates, supra note 11 (estimating the tax expenditure cost of 
the deduction). 
14. Douglas A. Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation-Tax Expenditure or Proper 
Allowance for Measuring Net Income? 78 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1979). 
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such a deduction presumes decline in value of the taxpayer's property without 
the confirmation of a realization event. And, Professor Geier assures us, 
realization is part of "the fundamental structure [of] the income tax."15 In 
which category-structure or policy--does all of this leave the depreciation 
deduction? While the basic tax treatment of qualified plans is conventionally 
characterized as a tax expenditure16 or, to use Professor Geier's term, a 
policy provision, there are strong reasons to conclude that the Code's 
qualified plan rules are consistent with normative tax principles. 17 
Some scholars respond to these difficulties by eschewing altogether 
the attempt to identify structural/normative provisions. 18 Others jettison the 
notion of a single set of normative rules and instead suggest a weaker 
formulation under which more than one set of rules may be structurally 
acceptable. 19 Yet others attempt to implement the normative/expenditure 
distinction in its stronger form by identifying a single set of normatively 
correct choices in the design of the income tax.20 The upshot is that the 
structural/policy distinction, which lies at the core of Professor Geier' s 
analysis, does not provide the courts sufficient guidance for resolving 
particular tax controversies. 
Even if the courts could workably implement the structural/non-
structural dichotomy, it is wrong to associate the latter kinds of Code 
provisions with congressional policy choices deserving of deference but not 
the former. Provisions that Professor Geier labels structural represent 
congressional policy decisions as surely as do those provisions that she 
classifies as nonstructural. 
Professor Geier, for example, identifies the realization requirement as 
structural.21 Over the years, Congress has enacted measures that impose tax 
on some forms of unrealized appreciation.22 Under these circumstances, the 
15. Geier, supra note 1, at 497. 
16. See Norman P. Stein, Qualified Plans and Tax Expenditures: A Reply to 
Professor Zelinsky, 9 Am. J. Tax Pol'y 225 (1991). 
17. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Tax Policy v. Revenue Policy: Qualified Plans, Tax 
Expenditures, and the Flat, Plan Level Tax, 13 Va. Tax Rev. 591 (1994); Edward A. Zelinsky, 
Qualified Plans and Identifying Tax Expenditures: A Rejoinder to Professor Stein, 9 Am. J. 
Tax Pol'y 257 (1991) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Rejoinder]; Edward A. Zelinsky, The Tax Treat-
ment of Qualified Plans: A Classic Defense of the Status Quo, 66 N.C. L. Rev. 315 (1988). 
18. See Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National 
Budget, 22 Nat'l Tax J. 244 (1969). 
19. See Zelinsky, Rejoinder, supra note 17, at 259. 
20. See Tax Expenditures, supra note 11; Estimates, supra note 11. 
21. Geier, supra note l, at 497. 
22. See, e.g., IRC §§ 475 (enacted in 1993) (requiring securities dealers to use 
mark-to-market accounting for securities inventories), 1256 (enacted in 1981) (requiring mark-
to-market accounting for futures contracts and some other derivatives). 
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"structural" rule of realization, where Congress has left it intact, reflects a 
legislative policy choice as deserving of judicial deference as the policy 
preferences embedded in any nonstructural Code provision. 
Professor Geier classifies "the distinction between ordinary income 
and capital gain" as structural.23 Of course, many others view the treatment 
of capital gains as a classic tax preference.24 But, even if the capital gains 
provisions are properly characterized as structural in nature, it is hard to think 
of provisions as to which Congress, over the years, has implemented its 
policy-based views more frequently. Sometimes Congress has made the 
taxation of capital gains relatively more favorable than the taxation of 
ordinary income;25 at other times, Congress has narrowed the gap between 
capital and ordinary gains. 26 These repeatedly expressed policy preferences 
are no less worthy of respect than those embodied in allegedly nonstructural 
portions of the tax statute. 
Finally, even if the structural/nonstructural distinction were workable 
and even if structural tax provisions were devoid of congressional policy 
content, we should be skeptical that judges (and academics) can discover 
underlying purpose that justifies disregard of statutory text. It is an unexcep-
tional claim that, confronted with statutory ambiguities or unreasonable 
results, courts can and should tum to secondary sources.27 However, 
Professor Geier' s claim is stronger than this, as was the final position of the 
Ninth Circuit in Albertson's: Even in the absence of ambiguity or absurdity, 
the courts can articulate underlying statutory purpose better than can the 
statute itself. When courts and commentators speak this way, they are 
essentially substituting their own policy preferences for those embodied in the 
statute and calling that substitution the implementation of underlying purpose. 
This is neither a new insight nor one limited to the federal tax statute. 
Several generations before Congress adopted the modem federal income tax, 
Francis Lieber, reflecting on the process of interpreting legal texts, observed: 
[I]n many cases, it is difficult to discover the motives which 
may have prompted those who drew up the text; but it is also 
23. Geier, supra note I, at 497. 
24. Surrey & McDaniel, supra note 7, at 3; Tax Expenditures, supra note 11 
(analyzing as a tax expenditure the maximum 28% rate on long-term capital gains); Estimates, 
supra note 11 (estimating the cost of the capital gains tax expenditure). 
25. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 402, 92 Stat. 2673. 2867 
(increasing capital gain deduction from 50% to 60% ). 
26. See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 30l(a), 100 Stat. 
2085, 2216 (abolishing deduction for capital gains). 
27. These ambiguities may reflect, inter alia, failures of draftsmanship, the exigen-
cies of political compromise, evolution over time of the meaning of particular words, or 
legislative delegation to the courts and administrators of responsibility for developing the law. 
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dangerous to construe upon supposed motives, that is, such 
as are not ascertainable from the interpretation of the text. 
Everyone is apt to substitute what his motives would have 
been, or, unconsciously perhaps, to fashion the supposed 
motives according to his own interests and views of the case; 
and nothing is a more ready means to bend laws, charters, 
wills, etc., according to preconceived purposes, than their 
construction upon supposed motives. To be brief, unless 
motives are expressed, it is exceedingly difficult to find them 
out, except by the text itself; they must form, therefore, in 
most cases, a subject to be found out by the text, not the 
ground on which we construe it.28 
In a somewhat more modem idiom, Justice Kennedy, chiding his colleagues 
for ignoring statutory text to implement the perceived spirit of legislation, 
similarly observed: "The problem with spirits is that they tend to reflect less 
the views of the world whence they come than the views of those who seek 
their advice. "29 
When Professor Geier applies her analysis to the Albertson 's 
litigation, the limitations of her analysis come into particular focus. The issue 
in Albertson's was whether an accrual-basis employer could, for 1983, deduct 
accrued but unpaid interest under its nonqualified deferred compensation 
arrangements or, instead, had to delay the deductibility of such interest under 
section 404(a)(5) until the employees actually received it. In its second 
confrontation with this issue, the Ninth Circuit, with explicit reluctance, held 
that, although the literal terms of the statute granted Albertson's its 1983 
deduction for accrued but unpaid interest, those terms were to be disregarded 
and the deduction denied to implement the underlying purposes of the Code' s 
provisions for deferred compensation. 30 
Professor Geier first treats section 404(a)(5), the statute at issue in 
Albertson's, as "structural" without explaining why. She draws an analogy to 
sections 483 and 1271-1275 for the proposition that time-value-of-money 
28. Francis Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics, or Principles of Interpretation 
and Construction in Law and Politics, with Remarks on Precedents and Authorities, 16 
Cardozo L. Rev. 1891, 1975 (1995). Lieber also observed that "interpretation may be 
predestined (interpretatio predestinata), if the interpreter, either consciously or unknown to 
himself, yet laboring under a strong bias of mind, makes the text subservient to his 
preconceived views, or some object he desires to arrive at." Id. at 1933. 
29. Public Citizen v. United States Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 473 (1989) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
30. See Albertson's, Inc. v. Commissioner, 42 F.3d 537 (1994), cert. denied, 116 
S.Ct. 51 (1995). 
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provisions are structural in nature, but she never tells us why these relatively 
new sections are themselves structural and, thus, an appropriate springboard 
from which to classify section 404(a)(5) as structural also. Moreover, sections 
483 and 1271-1275 apply only to property-based income; for those who 
believe it feasible to categorize certain features of the Code as structural, the 
distinction between property and services would seem to be a prime candidate 
for such categorization. Hence, even if sections 483 and 1271-1275 are 
conceded to be structural in nature, their "structural value"31 may plausibly 
be characterized as the importance of time-value-of-money considerations for 
property-derived income, a characterization that does not support the 
classification of section 404 as structural since that provision regulates the tax 
treatment of the opposite structural category, labor-based earnings. 
Having put section 404 into the basket marked "structure," Professor 
Geier then slights the explicit policy Congress made in that provision for 
1983 (the year at issue in Albertson's): to restrict the rule of delayed 
deductibility to the elements of deferred compensation otherwise deductible 
under section 162 (the deferred compensation itself), but not to delay 
deductibility for other elements of deferred compensation arrangements, 
including interest deductible under section 163. Ironically, this policy choice 
emerges with clarity from the kind of legislative history Professor Geier 
views as valuable in determining statutory purpose. 32 
Before its amendment in 1986, section 404(a)(5) provided that for 
nonqualified deferred compensation, amounts otherwise immediately 
deductible "under section 162" were instead to be deducted on a delayed 
basis, when taxed to the employees receiving such compensation. In 1986, 
Congress amended section 404(a), effective retroactively to 1984, to provide 
that all amounts otherwise deductible "under this chapter"-the income tax 
as a whole-were henceforth subject to the rule of delayed deductibility. 
Thus, for 1983, the year at issue in Albertson 's, the controlling version of 
section 404(a) remained the older version, which explicitly delayed deduct-
ibility only of amounts governed by section 162 and not of interest governed 
by section 163.33 
It is possible that, when Congress declared its 1986 alteration of 
section 404(a) to be effective as of 1984, it simply overlooked the possibility 
of extending the broader, interest-inclusive rule of delayed deductibility to 
1983. At least as plausibly, Congress chose the 1984 effective date because 
31. Geier, supra note 1, at 502. 
32. Id. at 503. 
33. These issues are treated more extensively in Edward A. Zelinsky, The Ninth 
Circuit's Albertson's Decision: Right for 1983, Wrong for Today, 63 Tax Notes 231 (Apr. 11 , 
1994) and Edward A. Zelinsky, Albertson 's: Why Courts Shouldn't Override Clear Statutory 
Language, 66 Tax Notes 1691 (Mar. 13, 1995) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Language]. 
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taxpayers had, since the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1984, 34 been 
on notice of Congress's desire to alter the rules governing nonqualified 
deferred compensation. If so, it was appropriate to amend section 404(a) as 
of the time of that notice. For earlier years, taxpayers had no reason to expect 
settled law to change retrospectively and were therefore entitled to the tax 
treatment of the preexisting rule, which limited delayed deductibility to 
amounts covered by section 162 and not to interest governed by section 163. 
Finally, Professor Geier, echoing the Ninth Circuit on its second try 
at Albertson's,35 discerns an "immediate implementive purpose ... to defer 
the employer deduction for amounts paid to employees under a nonqualified 
plan until the employees are taxed on these amounts."36 She finds this 
purpose to "create[] ... a matching regime" from "the face of the statute."37 
However, the face of the statute for 1983 indicates something very different 
and more precise: that amounts otherwise deductible immediately under 
section 162 were to be deducted on a delayed basis under section 404(a). 
When Professor Geier and the Ninth Circuit purport to find a broader purpose 
to delay the deductibility of interest governed by section 163, they are merely 
advancing their own preference for such a rule for 1983 and calling that 
preference underlying legislative purpose. This substitution of policy for 
Congress is particularly striking since Congress made the broader, interest-
inclusive rule of delayed deductibility effective for the following year. What 
is defended as the search for statutory purpose is merely the disregard of 
statutory text. 
To buttress her position on Albertson's, Professor Geier misdescribes 
the pro-taxpayer position taken by myself and others. We have, according to 
Professor Geier, consulted the dictionary and been told by Webster's that the 
taxpayer should receive a deduction for its accrued but unpaid interest.38 
There has been much thoughtful commentary on the Albertson's litigation, 
both pro-taxpayer and pro-Treasury. I know of no pro-taxpayer commentator 
who has defended Albertson's 1983 interest deduction along the mechanical, 
dictionary-based lines suggested by Professor Geier; I know of no pro-
Treasury commentator ( until Professor Geier) who characterized the opposing 
view in this superficial fashion. 
34. See Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 512(a), 98 Stat. 494, 862 
(amending § 404(b)). 
35. Professor Geier contends that her analysis is fundamentally different from the 
Ninth Circuit's. I am skeptical that this is so. Both the Ninth Circuit in its second Albertson's 
opinion and Professor Geier view a broad matching principle as justifying disregard of old 
§ 404(a)'s explicit limitation to § 162 deductions. 
36. Geier, supra note 1, at 519. 
37. Id. at 519. 
38. Id. at 518. 
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The pro-Albertson 's position is far more serious than Professor 
Geier' s caricature would indicate: For 1983, the year at issue in Albertson's, 
the statute delayed deductibility only for those deferred compensation items 
governed by section 162; interest is governed by section 163. Congress, 
however inartfully,39 brought interest within the rule of delayed deductibility 
starting in 1984. There are reasonable policy justifications for the rule 
embodied in the older, pre-1984 version of section 404. It was not the role 
of the courts to make the new interest-inclusive rule of delayed deductibility 
retroactive to 1983 when Congress made the new rule retroactive to 1984. 
When it addresses an issue explicitly, the text of the Code is the paramount 
expression of the tax law. 
Ill. THE ISSUE OF INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY 
As Professor Geier correctly notes, this line of discussion ultimately 
leads to the question of relative institutional capacities, i.e. , the normative 
roles of the Congress and the courts in molding the tax law. In my critique 
of the Ninth Circuit's Albertson's decision, I pointed to the history of section 
404( a)-which Congress had already changed before the Albertson's litigation 
began-as indicating the Code's great amenability to legislative correction. 
Congress' willingness and ability to remold tax law, I argued, counsels a 
restrained role for the courts. If the courts' implementation of the Code' s 
literal command produces results Congress finds unpalatable, Congress will 
change the Code. 40 
In contrast, Professor Geier envisions the courts vigorously shaping 
the tax law in its structural aspects rather than deferentially applying the Code 
as Congress enacts it. Among the factors Professor Geier cites to support a 
proactive role for the courts in tax controversies are the inherent limits of 
language,41 the "cumbersome" nature of the legislative process,42 the 
political freedom of Congress in passing structural (as opposed to policy) 
provisions,43 the expanding bulk of the Code as Congress repeatedly amends 
it,44 aggressive tax advisors' ability to manipulate an increasingly complicat-
ed tax statute,45 and revenue constraints.46 Professor Geier takes particular 
aim at my observation that the Albertson 's saga indicates the Code' s suscepti-
bility to legislative correction, declaring this approach "far too facile" in a 
39. See Zelinsky, Language, supra note 33, at 1698-99. 
40. See id. at l 700. 
41. See Geier, supra note l , at 508. 
42. Id. at 51 l. 
43. See id. at 508-09. 
44. Id. at 51 l. 
45. Id. at 511-12. 
46. Id. at 511 n.62. 
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world where Congress must balance any revenue-losing legislation it adopts 
with an offsetting revenue gain.47 
Of course, most of the courts' day-to-day business in tax matters is 
not as contentious as Albertson 's, for example, the application of uncontro-
verted legal principles to particular factual settings, the resolution of statutory 
ambiguities and conflicts, the filling of gaps in the statutory and administra-
tive framework. Cases like Albertson's are so valuable precisely because the 
choices are rarely posed as starkly as the Ninth Circuit ultimately perceived 
them: the terminology of the Code unequivocally pointing in one direction 
(immediate deductibility), the court's judgment-couched as underlying 
statutory purpose-leading to the other (delayed deductibility). It is in these 
infrequent but important settings that we must decide which institution-
Congress or the judiciary-has fundamental responsibility for making the tax 
law. 
Professor Geier' s reasons for assigning to the courts the more 
proactive role are not persuasive. As Professor Geier notes, language has its 
limitations;48 indeed, legal scholars have in recent years · developed an 
extensive literature exploring these limitations and their implications for the 
legal system.49 But, these concerns do not help decide the relative strengths 
of judges and legislators: they use the same language. There is no reason for 
language in the hands of judges to be more determinant, less problematic than 
in the hands of legislators. 
Professor Geier argues that statutory terminology is "self-executing," 
while judicial writing is "expository."50 Assuming that distinction to be true, 
it is unclear why it is meaningful: self-executing language may be preferable 
for purposes of the tax law. Important instances of judicial exposition in tax 
cases reveal the limits of judges' language. For over a generation, the lower 
courts, scholars, and the tax bar struggled with the meaning of the Supreme 
Court's National Carbide51 phraseology only to be told by the Court that it 
meant nothing at all.52 
No serious student of the legislative process would contest Professor 
Geier's assertion that that process is cumbersome. Again,- however, the 
relevant inquiry is the relative merits of the courts and the Congress. 
Although our system of litigation has many advantages, no one has ever 
argued that efficiency is one of them. Insofar as Professor Geier suggests that 
47. Id. at 511 & n.62. 
48. Id. at 508. 
49. See, e.g., A Symposium on Legal and Political Hermeneutics, 16 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 1879 (1995). 
50. Geier, supra note l , at 508. 
51. Nat'l Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949). 
52. Commissioner v. Bollinger, 485 U.S. 340, 349 (1988). 
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litigation is a less cumbersome means than the legislative process for 
resolving important questions of tax law, that suggestion reflects an 
unrealistic view of the judicial system. 53 
Professor Geier also contends that Congress can legislate particularly 
well on structural matters; while "hard decisions must be made" as to policy 
provisions, Congress is less constrained politically as to the Code's structural 
aspects and thus can legislate on them in a qualitatively superior fashion.54 
This contention will not prove persuasive to the reader unconvinced of the 
structural/nonstructural distinction and to the reader who views the structural 
aspects of the Code as embodying policy choices and thus also entailing 
"hard decisions" and political implications. There is, moreover, at least some 
tension between Professor Geier's characterization of the legislative process 
as unwieldy and her assertion that Congress legislates with freedom on 
structural tax matters. 
Even if Professor Geier is correct in assuming that Congress can 
legislate on structural matters without the pressures and distractions attending 
nonstructural provisions, that observation suggests that courts should be more 
(rather than less) respectful of the resulting legislative output, which often 
uses "the best words that Congress could have chosen."55 Given the 
assumption of superior legislative performance unfettered by political 
constraints, we should be skeptical that courts can find underlying legislative 
purpose that Congress, relieved from political pressures and thus free to use 
"the best words" available, failed to express in the statutory text. 
Professor Geier bemoans that placing a primary role on Congress to 
protect and upgrade the tax statute will increase the verbiage of an already 
prolix document. But, by assigning the courts to the vanguard, she would 
merely shift the verbiage to the judicial reporters. It is hard to see any net 
gain from this. 
Professor Geier correctly notes that aggressive tax advisors can 
manipulate statutory rules. But, judge-made rules can be exploited too: 
remember Mrs. Crane?56 
53. The taxpayer in Albertson's took its disputed interest deduction for 1983. Only 
when the taxpayer's request for Supreme Court review was finally denied in 1995, 12 years 
later, was there a final judicial determination of that deduction's propriety. We can only 
speculate about the legal costs incurred in this litigation, but, for both Albertson's and the 
government, such costs must have been considerable. 
54. Geier, supra note I, at 509. 
55. Id. 
56. For those who don't, in Mrs. Crane's celebrated litigation before the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the Court treated nonrecourse debt as equivalent for tax purposes to recourse 
debt and therefore to be included in the basis of property acquired subject to the debt. This 
rule (which was pro-fisc in Crane) was in subsequent years used by tax shelter developers to 
create basis and depreciation for investors at no economic risk to them. The lesson is that 
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Finally, Professor Geier argues that I am wrong to characterize the 
Code as highly correctable by legislation. An overly-sanguine view of 
Congress's willingness and ability to repair the tax statute, she suggests, 
improperly relieves the courts of their responsibility for fixing the tax law. 
My argument for the amenability of the tax law to legislative change 
had three components. Empirically, by the time the Albertson 's litigation 
reached the courts, Congress had already remedied the perceived statutory 
flaw for 1984 and later years. Congress had not merely reacted to a judicial 
decision indicating the need for legislative correction of section 404(a), but 
had been persuaded of the problem in advance of litigation. Second, annual 
tax legislation has, for better or worse, proven a durable feature of the 
legislative process, giving Congress the yearly opportunity to correct 
perceived deficiencies in the Code. In contrast to the courts' constitutional 
decisions (where for all practical purposes the courts are the ultimate 
decisionmakers) and the courts' application of statutes which Congress 
revisits infrequently, the opportunity typically exists for reasonably prompt 
legislative response to judicial applications of the tax statute. 
Third, the specialized institutions with primary responsibility for tax 
policy (Congress's tax-writing committees and the Treasury) are less 
capturable by interest groups than their nontax counterparts because tax 
policymakers are subject to multiple, often offsetting pressures, in contrast to 
bureaucracies and legislative committees with narrower, more homogeneous 
jurisdictions and constituencies. The more pluralist, competitive nature of tax 
institutions gives tax policymakers a greater ability to pursue corrective 
measures than nontax policymakers dependent for political support on more 
limited ranges of interest groups. 57 
I qualified my comments with the observation that it is indeed too 
facile to say that Congress can simply overturn judicial decisions.58 A 
judicial determination affects the legislative process since an interest group 
that wins in court has the easier task of blocking legislative action to preserve 
the status quo, while the loser has the harder task of obtaining affirmative 
legislative relief. Nevertheless, on balance, I concluded that the Code is very 
amenable to legislative correction and that this should caution against the 
courts assuming for themselves the task of repairing the tax law when literal 
application of the Code arguably leads to an incorrect policy result. 
judge-made rules, not just statutory rules, can be manipulated in unforeseen and unpleasant 
ways. See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947). 
· 57. This idea is developed more extensively in Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison 
and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax 
Institutions, 102 Yale L.J. 1165 (1993). 
58. Zelinsky, Language, supra note 33, at 1700. 
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Professor Geier replies that Congress must find revenue-raising 
measures to offset those tax changes that hurt the fisc.59 On its face, the rule 
of revenue-neutrality supports my position since it encourages Congress to 
adopt those repairs to the tax statute that procure additional tax money and 
thereby liberate Congress from that rule. Members of Congress otherwise 
indifferent to the requirements of tax policy will, given the mandate that 
revenue increases balance revenue losses, support corrections to the Code 
generating the funds needed to finance proposals which they advocate. 
Moreover, legislative corrections in the sense Professor Geier and I 
are discussing them are typically revenue-raisers. The need for legislative 
repair is classically perceived when the literal application of the Code leads 
to a pro-taxpayer result that is unacceptable to Treasury officials, Congress's 
tax-writers, and the professionals who advise them. The resulting change to 
the Code is typically scored as a revenue-raiser since it reverses a money-
losing judicial decision and is thus particularly attractive to legislators looking 
to finance their own proposals.6() 
Finally, even if the rule of revenue-neutrality on balance reduces 
Congress's ability to correct the Code, the tax statute remains quite amenable 
to legislative repair, given the other, offsetting factors which enhance 
Congress's capacity to mend the Code, i.e., the annual nature of tax 
legislation, the pluralistic character of tax institutions which gives tax 
policymakers greater independence than is possessed by their nontax 
counterparts. The suspectibility of the tax statute to legislative repair is 
particularly pronounced in comparison with judge-made constitutional law 
(essentially untouchable by Congress) and the courts' construction of those 
statutes revisited by Congress infrequently and subject to the jurisdiction of 
more capturable legislative and executive institutions. In short, if the Code is 
not amenable to congressional correction, no statute is. 
As this line of analysis makes clear, the amenability of the Code to 
legislative repair is ultimately an empirical question. Professor Geier counters 
my prime example-Congress's alteration of section 404(a) even before the 
Albertson's litigation began-with efforts to overturn the Soliman decision61 
and thus liberalize the deductibility of taxpayers' home office expenses. These 
efforts, Professor Geier indicates, have been hampered by the requirement 
that the money lost by repealing Soliman be balanced by a countervailing 
revenue gain.62 The final outcome of the Soliman saga remains to be seen; 
there is strong, bipartisan support for overturning that decision legislative-
59. Geier, supra note l, at 51 l n.62. 
60. I infer that Professor Geier disagrees with these observations. Id. at 496. 
61. Commissioner v. Soliman, 506 U.S. 168 (1993). 
62. Geier, supra note l , at 511 n.62. 
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ly.63 But even if Congress leaves standing the present statutory provisions 
governing home office deductions, that may in the final analysis reflect the 
considered judgment that the statute embodies the correct compromise of the 
contending considerations and that the Court properly (and literally) applied 
the statute to deny Dr. Soliman a home office deduction. 
IV. WHAT IS TEXTUALISM? 
Integral to Professor Geier's analysis is a mechanical conception of 
textualism. Textualism, Professor Geier tell us, is the process of consulting 
the dictionary to determine the meaning of particular words and then applying 
these dictionary-based meanings in a wooden fashion.64 Textualism in this 
formulation is the opposite of the search for purpose and, as Professor Geier 
makes clear, is a poor way to resolve Albertson 's or any other tax controver-
sy. So understood, textualism is indeed an appropriate target for critique. In 
fact, textualism as defined by Professor Geier is something of a straw man, 
a particularly cramped view of a text-centered approach to the Code that is 
both more substantive and more nuanced than Professor Geier's formula-
tion.65 
That approach starts with the proposition that for a variety of reasons, 
the modem tax law is quintessentially a statutory matter. Taxation ultimately 
involves political choices that appropriately belong to elected officials-the 
Congress and the President-who act through legislation. While courts are 
largely limited to deciding particular issues raised in cases litigated after-the-
fact, Congress can statutorily promulgate, prospectively and comprehensively, 
the many general rules and detailed provisions required of a modem tax 
system. While the Supreme Court can definitively resolve only a handful of 
tax controversies in any year, Congress has far greater capacity to provide 
legislative output for the perceived problems and needs of the tax system. 
The various courts of appeals can each settle legal issues for only a portion 
of the nation's taxpayers, while Congress legislates nationally and is thus able 
to make the tax law more predictable and uniform. The executive branch and 
Congress contain both specialized tax policymakers and expert tax staff, while 
the federal judiciary is largely a body of generalists.66 
63. See, e.g., Amy S. Cohen, Administration Open to Increasing Flexibility of Home 
Office Deduction, 95 TNT 109-5 (June 6, 1995) (LEXIS, FEDTAX library, TNT file). 
64. Geier, supra note 1, at 510, 518. 
65. Courts do indeed sometimes invoke dictionary definitions in tax cases. See, e.g., 
Dittler Bros., Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 896, 915 (1979). The point is that there is more 
than this to text-based interpretive methodology. 
66. The bulk of federal tax cases are initially litigated in the Tax Court, a 
specialized body, but appeals of Tax Court decisions, as well of those of other courts trying 
tax cases, are to courts of general jurisdiction. 
I 
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Since the statute as enacted by Congress and the President is, for 
these reasons, the fundamental source of the tax law, those who interpret and 
apply it should respect the statutory text and should view the text as the 
primary and initial basis for resolving tax controversies. Adjudicators should 
resort to secondary sources---case law, regulations, administrative authority, 
notions of tax policy ( even when dressed up as unexpressed statutory 
purpose)-only after the possibilities of statutory-based solutions have been 
exhausted. Courts should not lightly declare the Code ambiguous or its literal 
command unreasonable since any such declaration necessarily displaces the 
statute adopted by the elected officeholders with ultimate responsibility for 
the tax law. Since the Code is a relatively new and continually updated text, 
it requires less liberal construction than older texts which, by definition, could 
not have been drafted with an understanding of contemporary conditions and 
which often use words whose connotations have changed with the passage of 
time.67 
From this perspective, textualism in tax cases means an initial and 
primary emphasis on statutory text and a reasonably high threshold to be met 
before pronouncing the Code ambiguous or its literal application absurd. 
Interpreting and applying text in this fashion is not a mechanical, dictionary-
based process, but a creative one in which the reader actively engages the text 
to derive meaning. Individual readers bring to this process cultural and 
There may be benefits to using generalist judges as the adjudicators in tax cases, as 
well as in other technical areas of law. Requiring specialists to explain the issues to generalists 
can improve and focus the presentation of those issues. Specialists sometimes become overly 
enmeshed in the technicalities of their field and miss or de-emphasize matters more apparent 
to nonspecialists not so enmeshed. 
These observations do not detract from my statement in the text: Among the reasons 
we have assigned primary responsibility for the formulation of the tax law to the legislative 
process is the tax-writing expertise of the Congress and the executive branch. 
67. For example, the Framers of the Constitution authorized the Congress to 
maintain "Armies" and "a Navy" and to regulate these "land and naval Forces." U.S. Const., 
art. I, § 8, cl. 12-14. Few would doubt that, pursuant to this authority, Congress can 
constitutionally establish an Air Force. On the other hand, a statute adopted in 1995 referring 
to "the Army and Navy," but not mentioning the Air Force, should be understood literally, as 
applying only to the two older branches of the military, because in 1995 Congress knew of the 
Air Force's existence and, in the context of 1995, the statutory expression "Army and Navy" 
means just that. 
Similarly, those who revised § 404(a) in 1986 knew that, before revision, § 404(a) 
only delayed those deductions for nonqualified deferred compensation that were covered by 
"section 162." Indeed, the cross-reference to § 162 is precisely the terminology they chose to 
change effective as of 1984. 
The constitutional authority for an Air Force has been discussed by several 
commentators on the legal interpretation of texts. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in 
Translation, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1165, 1203 (1993). 
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individual assumptions and predilections different from those brought by 
others. Text-centeredness is thus a methodology based on the presumption 
and desirability of solutions grounded in statutory language, not a guarantee 
that such solutions can be found or agreed upon universally.68 
Important objections can be raised to this text-based approach to the 
Code. Professor Livingston, for example, argues that legislative history 
materials emerge contemporaneously from the same network of specialized 
professionals which develops the statutory language and that elected officials, 
if they read anything, read those materials, not the proposed statutory 
language.69 He is thus inclined to utilize legislative history materials earlier 
in the interpretive process and to give them greater weight. Alternatively, it 
can plausibly be argued that tax policy norms ought play a more central and 
earlier role in the interpretive process than my analysis suggests. Notions of 
indeterminacy generate skepticism that statutory language can convey 
meaning. 
These are real and important challenges to the approach which 
requires interpreters of the Code to exhaust, initially and extensively, the 
possibilities of text-based solutions before resorting to other sources and 
authorities. In contrast, Professor Geier dismisses text-centered methodology 
by focusing upon the narrowest and most mechanical formulation of that 
methodology, thereby attacking an easy target and ignoring the more 
demanding one. 
The text-based approach to the Code, as I have presented it, 
challenges another of Professor Geier's central tenets: the dichotomy between 
text and purpose. While Professor Geier treats respect for text and the search 
for purpose as opposites, such a search is often an important part of the 
reader's engagement with the text. 
Consider in this respect Professor Geier's analysis of section 102(a) 
and the Supreme Court's Duberstein decision.70 Professor Geier and I agree 
that the Court should have accepted the government's argument that "gift" in 
the context of section 102(a) refers to transfers in personal and family settings 
and that gifts cannot occur for tax purposes in employment or other business 
68. Textualism, according to Professor Eskridge, comes in both its "boneheaded" 
version and its "sensible" version. The former, frequently manifested by reliance on dictionary 
definitions, is the form of textualism criticized by Professor Geier and a fairly easy target; the 
latter corresponds more closely to the methodology I propose for the interpretation of the 
Code. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Fetch Some Soupmeat, 16 Cardozo L. Rev. 2209, 2210-14 
(1995). 
69. Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative History and 
the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 819 (1991). 
70. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960). The statutory provision at 
issue in Duberstein was the 1939 Code predecessor of § 170. 
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contexts. Professor Geier reaches this conclusion largely by invoking notions 
of structure that I find problematic,71 and she characterizes the Court's 
contrary analysis as "a plain-meaning approach to statutory language."72 
In fact, the Duberstein Court was not terribly interested in the text of 
section 102(a), but instead viewed its task as the application of "decisional 
law" principles previously "spelled out in the opinions of this Court"; indeed, 
the Court stated, the Duberstein "problem is one which, under the present 
statutory framework, does not lend itself to any more definitive statement" 
than that developed in prior case law.73 Similarly, the separate opinions of 
Justice Black74 and Justice Frankfurter75 did not address the language of 
section 102(a) or the implications of that language for the Duberstein 
decision. 
In contrast, under a text-centered approach, the Court should have 
grappled with the language of section 102(a), which, in its totality, excludes 
from gross income "the value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, 
or inheritance." The search for purpose would have been an important part 
of that inquiry, leading, in my judgment, to the conclusion that section 102(a) 
removes only family and personal transfers from the ambit of federal income 
taxation. 
That Professor Geier and I reach, from different directions, the same 
conclusion in Duberstein suggests the importance of the rare case like 
Albertson's. Different methodologies often lead to the same or similar results. 
As much legislative history material essentially tracks the statute, those more 
inclined to resort to such history and those more Code-oriented typically 
come to the same conclusions about particular cases. Given the influence in 
the tax-writing process of the specialists who work for Congress and the 
executive branch and given the widespread acceptance of certain norms in the 
tax community, those emphasizing tax policy considerations and those 
stressing statutory text often come to the same result because the statute 
reflects the policy-based input of those specialists and the norms of the 
professional community of which they are part. There is plenty of ambiguity 
in the Code, stemming, inter alia, from political compromise, poor draftsman-
ship, deliberate and implicit delegation to the courts and tax administrators, 
and the inherent limitations of language. Hence, even those aggressively 
searching for statutory answers to tax questions must often turn to the same 
secondary sources that others consult earlier in the process. 
71. See supra notes 7-19 and accompanying text. 
72. Geier, supra note 1, at 498. 
73. Duberstein, supra note 70, at 284. 
74. Id. at 293-94. 
75. Id. at 294-98. 
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In contrast, Albertson's is the rare and important case where different 
interpretive methodologies do not overlap, but lead to conflicting conclusions, 
and thus provides a useful opportunity to explore and contrast those 
methodologies. I do not dispute that those who would disallow Albertson's 
1983 deduction for accrued interest can raise serious objections to the text-
centered approach that leads me and others to condone that deduction. I do 
dispute that Professor Geier's description of dictionary-based textualism is a 
useful depiction of that text-centered approach. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In a Talmudic commentary, the Rabbis conclude that an egg laid by 
a chicken on the Sabbath cannot be used immediately to balance a broken 
table because that use would violate the strictures of the Sabbath. 76 The 
Rabbis, whose jurisprudence was at least as sophisticated as our own, fully 
understood that their hypothetical was of little practical relevance, but was a 
device for exploring the assumptions and implications of norms fundamental 
to their legal system. 
The Albertson's case is a modem tax law equivalent. It is of little 
practical import whether the taxpayer in Albertson's was entitled to a 1983 
interest deduction under the version of section 404(a) then in effect. It is of 
great importance to our understanding of the tax law and the interpretation 
of the Code how the Albertson's controversy is ultimately comprehended. 
Professor Geier and I agree neither as to result nor underlying 
analysis. I find that Professor Geier's basic approach is flawed and that when 
applied to Albertson's, it produces an incorrect outcome. I similarly find 
unpersuasive Professor Geier' s reasons for assigning to courts a proactive role 
in cases like Albertson's and believe that Professor Geier improperly 
characterizes the text-centered approach to the Code that underpins my view 
of Albertson's. 
Professor Geier and I, like the Rabbis who explored the jurisprudence 
of a Sabbath-hatched egg, do share the belief that colloquies of this sort are 
fundamental to a better understanding of laws and institutions. I thus 
welcome her contribution to the academic literature even while disagreeing 
with it. 
76. Babylonian Talmud, Beitzah 3b. 
